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3Purpose
• Provide an overview of emerging US space launch and space systems 
trends that are critical to the future of new space business cases – like 
space solar power
• But first…some background, some visions, and some needs.
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Cross Agency Support, Education & IG (+2010 fwd,
Construction & Environmental)
Aeronautics
Science
SFS (incl. SCaN, LSP, et al)
ISS R&D
ISS (Construction thru 2011, then Ops)
Cx ('07-'10), then SLS & Orion & Grd.Sys. ('11 Fwd)
Exploration R&D (was Shuttle Upgrades, SLI, BioSci,
HSRT, et al)
Space Technology
US Commercial Crew for ISS
ISS Crew (Soyuz) & Cargo (Commercial)
Shuttle
Earmarks
Rescissions (2012)
Rescissions (2012)
Purchase Power in 2003 $, NASA Inf. Index
Shuttle
Upgrades 
+Other R&D
SFS incl. SCaN, LSP
<- US Commercial Crew ISS - Boeing & SpaceX Spacecrafts ->
Space Tech.
Decision: End Shuttle post-ISS
2005 Budget Shifts Begin ...                                   
Orion & SLS >
Last Shuttle 
Flight
2003 Columbia
Return 
To Flight
<-- ISS Cargo (US Commercial, Antares & Falcon 9 Launch, 
& Dragon and Cygnus Spacecrafts) & ISS Crew Soyuz -->
Actual NASA budget increases =  1.535% 
per year average (compound) since 2003
Science 
Launchers 
Shuttle Production & Ops
E. Zapata NASA 8/31/2015
4
Background – The (Slightly) Bigger Picture
• The Entire NASA Budget since 2003 – and Purchasing Power 
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Background – The HEO Picture
• The Human Exploration & Operations (only) part of the NASA Budget
2015
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6Visions of Mars
• ISS, SLS, Orion
• Then Deep Space Habitat 
• Then Transit Habitat (& 
Propulsion/Power)
• Then – not shown:
• In-Space Stage(s), Assorted
• Mars Landers
• Descent
• Ascent/Return
• Cargo/Crew
• Mars (Surface) Habitats
• Taxis
• Rovers
• Power Plants
• In-situ Resource Plants
• Equipment
http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/journey-
to-mars-next-steps-20151008_508.pdf (NASA)
7Visions of Mars – or not?
• National Research Council 2014
“Human Spaceflight Budget Projections. With current flat or even inflation-adjusted 
budget projections for human spaceflight, there are no viable pathways to Mars.
Potential Cost Reductions. The decadal timescales reflected above are based on 
traditional NASA acquisition. Acceleration might be possible with substantial cost 
reductions resulting from
a. More extensive use of broadly applicable commercial products and practices
b. Robust international cost sharing (that is, cost sharing that greatly exceeds 
the level of cost sharing with the ISS)
c. Unforeseen significant technological advances in the high-priority 
capabilities.”
8Visions of Mars – or maybe?
• Jet Propulsion Laboratory 2015 – Price, Baker, Naderi
“This was the motivation for this study of a ‘‘minimal architecture’’ based on 
a high technology readiness level and the concept of staggered mission 
campaigns, in order to stay close to the current HSF annual budget adjusted 
for inflation.
This work was aimed at showing an 
example (an existence proof) that 
journeys to Mars could be doable 
using technologies that NASA is 
currently pursuing and on a time 
horizon of interest to stakeholders --
without large spikes in NASA 
budget.”
http://spirit.as.utexas.edu/%7Efiso/telecon
/Price_5-20-15/Price_5-20-15.pdf
9Visions of Mars – the Scope of the Challenge
• SLS with Larger Upper Stage (~100+t>LEO)
• 2 SLS/Year, 1 w. Orion as Payload. Other Payload TBD (No $ available)
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Visions of Mars – the Scope of the Challenge
• Or alternate futures? Other stakeholders.
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Needs
• Option 1: Getting More Money?
“Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less-constrained budget, 
ramping up to approximately $3 billion per year in real purchasing power above 
the FY 2010 guidance in total resources.” 
-Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, by The 
Review of US Human Spaceflight Plans Committee
• Also NRC 2014, et al
• Option 2: Getting More Time? (& Money, & Doing Less)
• JPL 2015 et al
• Mars landing by 2039
• Assumption of infinite patience – if neglecting certain stakeholders
There’s a reason stakeholders are called “stake” holders
12
Needs
• Option 3: Adapting? – like Smith Corona?
• For a time, saw threat as typewriters manufactured abroad
• Response: Plants moved abroad
• For a time, created “personal word processors” –advanced for their time
• Why use someone else’s software?
• Why use someone else’s electronics?
• Why use someone else’s floppies?
• Numerous advantages over those “PCs”
• Bankruptcy 1995
Adapting - right to the end
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Visions of Launch Affordability
…Once upon a time…the Reusable Launch Vehicle program, NASA, late 1990’s
$1000/lb = $2,222/kg
14
Affordability – How are we doing?
• What do the numbers tell us?
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• Holistic view, recent/old, cargo/crew, commercial/cost-plus
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• The US is regaining commercial launch market share
• Customers appear glad to return – for the right price
Emerging Space
Data through 2014 from US DOT: http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/node/490911
2015 data from assorted launch records
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US Launch Prices (Costs to the Customers)
$4,600/kg $2,000/kg?
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This is Not New – and it’s not limited to launch systems
• SpaceHab Price-Water House Report 1991
• SpaceHab was 1/10th the cost as commercial (as defined then) versus 
business-as-usual
• One of a handful of historical data points with a Business-as-Usual ~ 
analog (SpaceLab)
• Dependent on Shuttle; very much an ECLSS system extension 
shielded within the Orbiter payload bay
SpaceHab double-research module, 
STS-107 Columbia, NASA
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In the Pipe
• Reusability – Falcon 1st Stage(s)?
• ULA Vulcan launcher – price drops?
• Constellations of Sat’s – Round 2?  OneWeb, Google/SpaceX, etc.
• Small Launch – business plans around the business plans of ever more 
Small Sat capabilities
21
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Images/so
lar_power_satellite_concept.jpg (Public Domain)
By permission, John C. Mankins
“Integrated Symmetrical Concentrator” (ISC) 
Solar Power Satellite, late 1990s, NASA
“SPS-ALPHA” (Solar Power Satellite by 
means of Arbitrarily Large Phased Array), 
2013, Mankins Space Technology, Inc.
Visions of Space Solar Power
22
Relevance to Space Solar Power
Are the barriers to Mars and Space Solar Power the same?
• Both need more affordable space transportation
• Both need more affordable space systems
• Will both always be 20 years away?
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Relevance to Space Solar Power – A New Option
1. Get Money
2. Get Time
3. Adapt
4. NASA as Investor – transforming to become “one of many customers” 
NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/partnership/comm_space/
Space Systems
-Launch
-Spacecraft
-Habitation
Decreasing Prices, 
Decreasing Costs
Highest Price, 
Unsustainable Costs
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Relevance to Space Solar Power – A New Option – Make. Buy. Partner
Major characteristics of a NASA COTS/CRS “like” partnership 
include:
• Significantly improved alignment of incentives – both short and long 
term - partnering decision considers potential non-government 
market / business cases (seen more in SpaceX getting commercial 
launches, but OSC not; not seen in either side yet for their 
spacecraft)
• Private sector market pressures akin / aligned with the gov’t 
“ops” long term POV
• Other potential future work; e.g., cargo business can lead to 
crew business
• Investor mindset, government as “investor” (beyond “engineering 
management” or “contractor management” or “smart buyer”)
• Early commitment to buy future services in block contracts; 
addresses / reduces long term business case (investment) risk 
• OTA / SAA with fixed payments for achieving development 
milestones (not cost plus); more risk to the private sector partner, 
less risk to the government
• Small gov’t office for acquisition & management (e.g., ~3% of total 
program cost)
• Maturation / risk buy down with numerous early partners; delay 
down-selecting prematurely
• Two providers selected, not just one (competition built in 
throughout, even in the operational phases)
• “Bundling” the acquisition; e.g., service requires a vehicle and a 
spacecraft
COTS/CRS - another existence proof of 
the potential for NASA to FIRST invest, to 
FIRST enable a healthier market, THEN to 
procure - at much less cost.
Example-$4.0B to $1.7B Falcon 9 
investment predicted if traditional ways 
of doing business vs. ~$300M* actual 
(*inclusive of private investment; excludes Dragon; less 
if considering actual cost to NASA – 2011 Commercial 
Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems 
Pursuant to Section 403 of the NASA Authorization Act 
of 2010)
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Relevance to Space Solar Power
• NASA as Investor / Partner
• Smaller amounts of $ to justify
• NASA (and partner contributions) $ leveraged into large effects
• Business case maturation
• Strategic technology maturation / demonstration
• Modularity
• Assembly
• Transmission
• Encourage non-government investors
• “NASA on board” (credibility of NASA)
• “Virtuous cycle” – more investors ease the case for more 
NASA partnering (credibility of the business)
“As was mentioned previously, a number of technology and systems level 
demonstrations can be accomplished without new space transportation”
-The Case for Space Solar Power, J. Mankins
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Closing
• Space sector supply AND demand can, will and must grow together
• Large scale programs – like Space Solar Power – face similar challenges
Money
Time
Adapt
Transform
• An increased emphasis on public-private partnerships offers the most 
viable path forward
…when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth? -Sherlock Holmes in The Sign of the Four
You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried 
everything else. –Winston Churchill
27
Backup
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Comparison of NASA Space Exploration Architecture Level Assessments
Study NASA Human 
Spaceflight 
Budget? (and/or 
inflation)
CAS, Science, 
Aeronautics $?
STMD $?
HEO SFS, M/G
Ops, & R&D $?
Mars 
Exploration 
Possible?
SLS,
Orion?
ISS? Budget Profile incl. 
NASA support for 
Private Space 
Stations post-ISS?
Budget for 70t 
SLS to 110t? 
To 130t?
2014 NRC 
Committee on 
Human Spaceflight
..increases faster
than *inflation
(pp.41)
†Unaddressed
Unaddressed / 
**Frozen/Flat?
Yes – Phobos
early 2040s, 
Mars surface 
2050s
Yes Ends
2028
~No? Unaddressed
2015 JPL H2M
Minimal 
Architecture
…increases at 
rate of *inflation
†Unaddressed
Unaddressed / 
**Frozen/Flat?
Yes – surface 
by 2039
Yes Ends
2028
~No? Unaddressed
2015 Planetary 
Society Humans 
Orbiting Mars
Evolvable Lunar 
Architecture w. PPP
…increase at
historical budget 
growth…
All NASA areas 
increase at 
same rate as 
HEO
Lunar 1st, 
Mars as
follow-up 
study
**No n/a-> Possible - Budget 
set aside –ample 
fund split possible
n/a
Evolvable Mars 
Campaign
* aerospace, space systems specific inflation per se ill-defined
** moves funds from X to Y
† if flat, this shifts the whole NASA portfolio split
Segues off of JPL H2M Minimal Architecture
TBD
What about the 1991 Space Exploration 
Initiative (SEI)? Budget growth by 
multiples of then current. Rest ~ n/a.
